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Abstract 
This paper examines Japan’s aid sanctions policy toward African countries since new 
guidelines for Japanese ODA were introduced. There were three cases of positive 
reinforcement in Africa, i.e. in Madagascar, Zambia) and Guinea. Also, the Japanese 
government implemented nine negative reinforcements in the region, i.e. in Kenya, 
Zaire, Malawi, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Togo, Nigeria and Gambia. Although 
Japan applied positive reinforcement and provided additional foreign aid to assist the 
political and economic reforms in three African countries, it would be an 
oversimplification to say that these “positive reinforcement” methods have effectively 
contributed to the improvement of the political situations in these countries. On the 
other hand, whether Japan’s and other aid donors’ measures of the “negative 
reinforcement” have effectively contributed to the improvement of the political situation 
in African countries remains as a contentious issue.  
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1. Introduction 
When the Cold War ended, the Japanese government introduced new aid guidelines 
where it pledged to impose aid sanctions on those aid recipient countries whose 
governments violated human rights or democratic principles. During the Cold War, 
Japan seldom showed an interest in, or rather overlooked, the political conditions in aid 
recipients. Furthermore, there have been instances when Japan’s ODA caused a political 
scandal, as happened in the Philippines during the Marcos regime (Orr, 1993a: 98).  
 
Since the introduction of the new aid guidelines the Japanese government has used its 
aid power to influence aid recipients not only by employing “negative reinforcement” 
but also through the use of the “positive reinforcement”1. In other words, Japan can 
choose to impose negative reinforcement (the suspension or a decrease in foreign aid) 
on recipient countries where undesirable policy changes occur, while positive 
reinforcement (an increase in foreign aid) would be applied to aid recipients that 
conduct desirable polices in the light of Japan’s ODA Charter (Furuoka, 2006). 
 
This paper examines Japan’s aid sanctions policy toward African countries since new 
guidelines for Japanese ODA were introduced. There were three cases of positive 
reinforcement in Africa, i.e. in Madagascar (1991), Zambia (1992) and Guinea (1992). 
Also, the Japanese government implemented nine negative reinforcements in the region, 
i.e. in Kenya (1991), Zaire (1991), Malawi (1992), Sudan (1992), Sierra Leone (1993), 
Zambia (1993), Togo (1993), Nigeria (1994) and The Gambia (1994) (see Furuoka, 
2005, 2006). 
      
                                                 
1 “Sekkyoku-teki kanren” is the Japanese official term for “positive reinforcement”. “Shokyoku-teki 
kanren” is the term for “negative reinforcement”. Sekkyoku-teki and shokyoku-teki mean “positive” and 
“negative”, respectively; kanren means “linkage” 
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2. Positive Reinforcement in Africa 
a) Madagascar 
In 1989, in Madagascar, the military socialist government led by Didir Ratsiraka won 
the general election. However, soon after the election, people became disillusioned and 
started to criticise the socialist regime. As an anti-government movement gained 
strength, the political situation in Madagascar became shaky. In 1991, the socialist 
government ceased to rule the country. A referendum for a new constitution was held in 
August 1991. In November 1991, a plan to hold presidential and parliamentary elections 
was announced. With the help of the French government, the new constitution was 
implemented and elections were held. In the presidential election in February 1992, 
Albert Zafy defeated Ratsiraka and became Madagascar’s new president.2  
 
To support political changes in Madagascar, the Japanese government donated ¥5.46 
million (US$43 thousand) to purchase portable radios for the election. As Japan’s ODA 
1993 noted, “The two-way portable radios donated to the City of Tananarive… proved 
to be quite helpful in the presidential and parliamentary elections held in that country 
(Madagascar)” (MOFA, 1993a: 37). In one year, Japan’s ODA to Madagascar increased 
more than three-fold from US$13 million in 1990 to US$40 million in 1991 (MOFA, 
1995: 402-423). 
 
b) Zambia 
In Zambia, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was in power for more than 
25 years, since that country’s independence. Gradually, a one party system was 
established in the country, and fair elections had not been held. In October 1991, 
prompted by moves towards democracy in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
                                                 
2 In 1997, Zafy was defeated by Ratsiraka in the presidential election. 
 
 
3
general and presidential elections took place in Zambia. The Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD) won a landslide victory and a critic of President Kenneth Kaunda 
and co-founder of the MMD, Frederick Chiluba, was inaugurated as the new president 
of Zambia. This was the first time since Zambia’s independence 27 years before that the 
power in the country was transferred peacefully (MOFA, 1993b: 146). 
 
In response to positive changes in Zambia, “Japan is assisting the new administration, 
which is facing economic difficulties, in its efforts to move toward democracy and a 
market-oriented economy. In March 1992, it provided ¥3.5 billion (US$26.9 million) in 
non-project grant aid” (MOFA, 1992: 28). 
Japan’s ODA to Zambia doubled from US$40 million in 1990 to US$82 million in 
1991. By 1993, it increased by 45 percent and reached US$116 million, making Japan 
Zambia’s second biggest aid donor. In 1992, Zambia received from the Japanese 
government a bilateral loan amounting to ¥9.74 billion (US$74.9 million) to support 
privatisation and industrial reform projects. In the same year, Japan gave a grant 
amounting to ¥912 million (US$7.01 million) for the Kafue bridge reconstruction 
project (MOFA, 1995: 429-431). 
 
c) Guinea 
In 1990, Guinea’s military government pledged to introduce political reforms. The 
government promised to enact the country’s constitution and give rights to the people. 
The new constitution established a two-party system and universal adult suffrage 
(MOFA, 1993c: 38-39). Guinea’s government also pledged to hold a general election 
and to peacefully transfer power to a civilian government.3
  
                                                 
3 President Lansana Conte won elections both in 1993 and 1998. 
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Japan showed support for positive changes in Guinea by providing funds to assist the 
country’s general election. The Japanese government gave non-project grant assistance 
to purchase equipment necessary for running the election in 1992. However, according 
to Japan’s ODA 1993, “As Guinea had postponed the election itself,4 the counterpart 
funds (Japanese funds) have not been used yet” (MOFA, 1993a: 37). 
 
Japan’s bilateral grants to Guinea increased almost three-fold from US$7.7 million in 
1990 to US$21 million in 1991, and amounted to US$24 million in 1992. In 1991, with 
ODA amounting to US$98 million, Japan was the second biggest aid donor to Guinea 
after France (MOFA, 1995: 395-397). 
 
d) Tokyo International Conference on African Development 
Besides giving bilateral assistance to African countries, the Japanese government 
organized the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 
October 1993. The conference adopted the “Tokyo Declaration on African 
Development” that urged African countries to learn from Asia’s experience. The 
declaration announced, “We acknowledge some relevance of the Asian experience for 
African development. The very diversity of successful Asian countries gives hope that 
lessons can be drawn for African development” (MOFA, 2007).  
 
The Economist reported that at the Tokyo conference the debate concerning the lessons 
from the East Asian development model was intense. “Perhaps the brand of capitalism 
urged upon Africa by western donors was faulty, ran the implication: Africa should 
follow the Asian way”. The conference became a platform to deliver the voice of 
                                                 
4 The presidential election was held in 1993. The legislative election after having been postponed several 
times was finally held in 1995.  
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dissent against Western methods of development. According to The Economist, while 
Western aid is increasingly conditional upon clean and open government, some of the 
African leaders felt unhappy about this interference. As the journal put it, “Uganda’s 
President Yowen Museveni told the Tokyo conference that donors should not interfere 
in Africa’s general development. Foreigners had interfered with Africa for the past 500 
years, he said, and its present crisis had been caused mainly by outsiders” (The 
Economist, October, 1993: 35). 
 
3. Negative Reinforcement in Africa 
a) Kenya 
During the Cold War period, Kenya was ruled by a single party - the Kenya African 
National Union - led by Daniel Arap Moi.5 In 1991, large pro-democracy and anti-Moi 
regime rallies broke out in Kenya. The political situation became chaotic and Moi’s 
regime began to lose its grip on power. The international community, including Japan, 
was concerned over the worsening human rights conditions in Kenya after the mass 
rallies erupted. However, the Kenyan government ignored international criticisms and 
continued to violate human rights. When the situation went from bad to worse, Moi’s 
government tried to reach a compromise and promised to hold presidential and general 
elections. After the presidential election at the end of 1992, Moi retained power due to a 
split in the opposition party that enabled him to win the election with a narrow majority 
(MOFA, 1993b, 144-145). 
 
During political upheaval in Kenya, Japan in concert with other donor countries took 
serious measures to improve the political situation in that country. It should be noted 
                                                 
5 Jomo Kenyatta was president of Kenya until his death in 1978. He was succeeded by Moi. In 2002, Moi 
stepped down following elections and was replaced by Mwai Kibaki.   
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that in contrast to its independent diplomatic policy toward repressive regimes in Asia, 
the Japanese government tends to follow other countries’ initiatives in Africa. Japan’s 
ODA 1992 states that to send a clear message to Moi’s regime, Japan and other aid 
donors refused to announce specific amounts of foreign aid for Kenya (MOFA, 1992: 
29). As a step further, in 1992, Japan suspended foreign aid to Kenya. According to 
Japan’s ODA 1993, “International criticism of Kenya for human rights abuses, 
corruption, and the delay in economic reforms has been mounting, and donor countries 
have suspended their aid to finance Kenya’s current account deficits” (MOFA, 1993a: 
39-40). 
 
In 1993, Japan lifted the use of negative reinforcement when the Kenyan government 
made efforts to accommodate the international community and improved the political 
situation.6 Since then, Kenya has been a major recipient of Japan’s ODA in Africa. 
From 1993 to 1995, Japan was the top aid donor in Kenya. Japan’s bilateral grants to 
Kenya increased from US$57 million in 1993 to US$78 million in 1994, and reached 
US$93 million in 1995 (MOFA, 1997: 336-337).  
 
However, Japan’s provision of foreign aid to the abusive regime in Kenya has drawn 
strong criticism from international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 
especially Amnesty International, that have repeatedly expressed concerns over the 
human rights violations under Moi’s regime. Amnesty International’s report expressed 
grave concerns about human rights condition in Kenya (Asahi Shinbun, June 26, 1997).  
 
                                                 
6 After the election, the leader of the opposition party was appointed chairman of the anti-corruption 
committee. The Japanese government considered this step a sign of improvement and, in 1993, decided to 
give a bilateral loan amounting to ¥8.2 billion (US$73 million) to support Kenya’s export program. 
Following Japan’s example, in November 1993, other donor countries lifted the suspension of aid to 
Kenya. In addition, in 1994 Japan dispatched a high level mission to Kenya as part of a technical co-
operation program (MOFA, 1993a: 40). 
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International NGOs demanded that Tokyo suspend foreign aid to Kenya. Furthermore, 
when in August 1997 anti-Moi demonstrations escalated again, some demonstrators 
criticised Tokyo for supporting an undemocratic ruler (Sankei Shinbun, August 9, 
1997). Japan ignored the demonstrators’ demands to stop aid to Moi’s regime. 
According to Sankei Shinbun, “The Japanese government maintained that President Moi 
was not a dictator, thus it was unnecessary for Japan to suspend aid to Kenya” (Sankei 
Shinbun, September 12, 1997). 
 
b) Zaire 
Zaire is another African country that for a long time was ruled by a military junta led by 
Mobutu Sese Sako.7 His party - the Popular Movement of the Revolution - was the only 
party that existed in the country, others being banned. In 1990, the government restored 
a multiparty system. However, despite the establishment of the National Conference, in 
September 1991 large-scale riots broke out in Zaire (MOFA, 1993b, 145-146).  
  
The outbreak of violence and lootings led many foreign civilians to flee Zaire where 
public safety was severely deteriorating. The Japanese embassy in Kinshasa was closed. 
It should be noted that this event - not the fact that the country’s human rights 
conditions had deteriorated - was cited by the Japanese government as the reason why it 
suspended foreign aid to Zaire. As Japan’s ODA 1992 put it, “Riots have erupted, 
public order has deteriorated, and Japan has consequently had to pull out its embassy. 
As a result, aid to that country has become difficult to implement in practice and thus 
has been suspended” (MOFA, 1992: 29). 
 
                                                 
7 Zaire’s name was changed to the Democratic Republic of Congo when Laurent Kabila replaced Mobutu 
in 1997.  
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At the same time, the Japanese government announced that it would use the ODA 
Charter as the guidance to decide whether it should lift the use of negative 
reinforcement in Zaire. Japan’s ODA 1992 stated, “Japan will give overall 
consideration to the four ODA guidelines and the state of public order in that country 
when studying whether to resume aid to that country” (MOFA, 1992: 29). 
 
Before Tokyo completely halted aid to Zaire, Japan provided ¥2,117 million (US$14.1 
million) in foreign aid to that country in 1990. Since the introduction of negative 
reinforcement, Japan has provided to Zaire foreign aid of an emergency and 
humanitarian nature only. The amount of grant aid to Zaire in 1995 was ¥68 million 
(US$635 thousand); it remained at a low level of ¥61 million (US$656 thousand) in 
1996 (MOFA, 1997: 103). 
 
c) Malawi  
In Malawi, the title of “President for life” was given to Hastings Kamuzu Banda. His 
party - the Malawi Congress Party - ruled the country throughout the Cold War. With 
changes in the international political arena, Malawi’s population started to demand more 
democracy in the country’s politics. However, Banda’s regime tried to suppress this 
trend for democratisation and resorted to serious abuses of human rights. This drew 
criticisms from aid donor countries. Since there were no improvements in Malawi’s 
domestic situation, a donor countries’ consultative group meeting was held in May 
1992, where it was decided to suspend aid to Malawi to finance balance of payment 
deficits in donor countries. Due to aid sanctions, the Malawi government promised to 
hold a referendum to decide the country’s political system. In June 1992, the 
referendum was held peacefully under international monitoring and voter approved 
reforms. A new constitution that guaranteed a multiparty system was adopted. In the 
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first multiparty elections in Malawi in 1994, Bakili Muluzi defeated Banda and became 
the country’s president (MOFA, 1993c: 96-97). 
 
Japan used negative reinforcement in Malawi and together with other aid donors 
suspended foreign aid to cover its balance of payment deficits.8 The Japanese 
government stressed the fact that regarding the aid policy toward Malawi it committed 
itself to work closely with other aid donors. As Japan’s ODA 1993 stated, “Japan will 
weigh the advisability of resuming aid in concert with the international community” 
(MOFA, 1993a: 40). Furthermore, Japan’s ODA 1996 points out, “At the Consultative 
Group for Malawi in May 1992, Japan and other donors expressed their concern with 
the slow pace of Malawi’s democratisation and its repressive policies, which are 
inimical to human rights, and took measures to suspend new assistance for international 
balance of payments support” (MOFA, 1996: 103). 
 
Japan’s ODA to Malawi has remained at a low level since 1992, when it amounted to 
US$23 million. In 1993, Japan’s aid to Malawi was US$24 million. However, in 1994, 
when Tokyo decided to lift negative reinforcement, the amount of aid increased more 
than four-fold and reached US$100 million (MOFA, 1997: 340-341). 
 
d) Sudan 
In Sudan, more than a dozen years of political instability caused by changes of 
governments through coup d’etats brought the country economic hardship and civil war. 
In 1989, an Islamic fundamentalist group - the National Islamic Front (NIF) - led by 
Omar Hassan al-Bashir staged another coup d’etat. After the coup, the NIF gradually 
                                                 
8 The Japanese government decided to lift negative reinforcement in Malawi and provided bilateral loans 
for entrepreneurship development and a drought recovery program (MOFA, 1994a: 57).  
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increased its strength and presence in the country’s political life. The NIF succeeded in 
gaining enough power to control Sudan and reinforce a one-party system (MOFA, 
1993b, 133-134). 
  
In December 1992, in response to the worsening human rights conditions in Sudan, the 
United Nation’s General Assembly adopted, with the overwhelming support of all 
countries, including Japan, a resolution expressing grave concern about violations of the 
human rights of the victims of disasters, ethnic minorities, and personnel of 
international humanitarian aid organisations (MOFA, 1993b, 133-134). 
 
Serious human rights violations were observed in Sudan’s southern city of Juda. Japan 
and other countries have repeatedly urged Sudan to take remedial measures, but to no 
avail. So, in accordance with the ODA Charter, Japan stopped all aid to Sudan, except 
emergency and humanitarian aid (MOFA, 1996: 102). 
  
Japan’s bilateral grants to Sudan decreased from US$2.53 million in 1991 to US$1.40 
million in 1992, and decreased further to US$1.00 million in 1993. Technical co-
operation declined from US$392 million in 1991 to US$144 million in 1992, and was 
almost halted in 1993 (MOFA, 1997: 69). 
 
There are critics who condemn Western countries’ intervention in Sudan. For example, 
Mohindeen argues that Sudan is labelled a terrorist state by Western countries that 
impose sanctions. He claims that what the West really fears is the Islamic orientation of 
the Sudanese government and its commitment to eliminating Western hegemony in that 
region. According to Mohindeen, if Sudan succeeds in establishing a genuine 
democratic political system based on Islam, it will have a revolutionary impact on those 
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Muslim countries in Africa that are currently ruled by ruthless dictators and hereditary 
rulers whose regimes owe their survival to Western support and patronage (New Straits 
Times, July 22, 1996).  
 
e) Sierra Leone 
In Sierra Leone, a single party - the All People’s Party (APP) - controlled the country 
during the Cold War period. In August 1991, in response to a new international political 
situation, a referendum for a new constitution was held and a multiple party system was 
approved and introduced in that country. However, in December 1992, after a coup 
d’etat led by Captain Valentaine Strasser, a military government seized power. 
President Joseph Saidu Momoh was ousted and the democratisation process was halted. 
Various human rights abuses, such as suppression of the mass media, arrests, detentions 
and executions became rampant (MOFA, 1993c: 56-57).  
 
In 1993, the situation improved after Sierra Leone’s military government announced its 
intention to release political prisoners and transfer power to a civilian government 
within three years.9 In 1994, Sierra Leone announced a plan to establish the Interim 
National Electoral Commission to supervise the general election (Furuoka, 2006). 
 
Despite international criticisms, the human rights situation in Sierra Leone did not 
improve. The Japanese government repeatedly expressed its concern over the human 
rights condition in that country. In May 1993, when the promised changes in the 
political situation did not materialise, Tokyo suspended aid to Sierra Leone. An 
exception was made for aid of an urgent or humanitarian nature. In October 1993, 
                                                 
9 In January 1996, President Strasser was ousted after a coup d’etat led by Brigadier Maada Bio. The 
elections were held in February and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected president.  
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following the announcement of the transfer of power in Sierra Leone, Japan lifted aid 
sanctions (MOFA, 1994: 57).  
 
In 1992, Japan’s ODA to Sierra Leone remained at a marginal level of US$3.8 million. 
In 1993, it amounted to US$4.1 million. When aid sanctions were abolished, Japan’s aid 
increased more than two-fold and reached US$10.3 million in 1994 making Japan Sierra 
Leone’s top aid donor (MOFA, 1996: 357-358). 
 
f) Togo 
In Togo, the military government led by Gnassingbe Eyadema banned all opposition 
parties. When new political thinking came in lieu of the Cold War mentality, the Togo 
government legalised opposition political parties and Eyadema agreed to share power 
with a transitional government. The National Conference appointed Joseph Kokou 
Koffigoh as Prime Minister of the transitional government. In 1992, a referendum was 
held, and the voters approved a new constitution that reduced presidential powers. In 
August 1993, most of the opposition candidates withdrew from the presidential election 
allowing Eyadema to win a landslide victory (Furuoka, 2006). 
 
Japan was seriously concerned about these negative developments in Togo and, in 1993, 
suspended in principle aid to that country. From 1993 to 1995, Japan’s ODA to Togo 
remained at a marginal level decreasing from US$3.4 million in 1993 to US$1.7 million 
in 1994, and further diminishing to US$0.7 million in 1995 (MOFA, 1997: 357-358). 
 
g) Zambia 
In Zambia, President Kenneth Kaunda controlled the country since its independence in 
1964 and throughout the Cold War period. In 1990, Kaunda expressed an intention to 
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restore the multiparty system. In the following year, he declared the abolishment of the 
socialist policy and established a national conference. Presidential elections were held 
and Frederick Chiluba of the opposition party - the Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD) - won the election and became the country’s new president 
(Furuoka, 2006). 
 
Although a peaceful transfer of power took place after the election, the former president 
attempted a coup d’etat in 1993. Chiluba declared a state of emergency; human rights 
conditions deteriorated to the concern of the international community. Following other 
aid donors’ initiatives, Japan used negative reinforcement and cut her foreign aid to 
Zambia for the balance-of-payment deficits support (MOFA, 1995: 54).  
  
h) Nigeria 
In Nigeria, a military government led by Ibrahim Babangida controlled the country and 
prohibited political parties. In 1989, the ban was lifted and two parties were permitted to 
contest in the election. In 1990 and 1992, local government elections and legislative 
elections were held. In July 1993, the Social Democratic Party’s (SDP) candidate, 
Moshod Abiola, won the presidential elections. However, Babangida annulled the 
results of the election and installed an interim government led by Chief Ernest 
Shonekan. The political chaos that followed was ended by a military coup d’etat led by 
General Sani Abacha.10 After the coup, Shonekan was ousted and Nigeria returned to 
military rule (MOFA, 1993b, 150-151). 
  
Human rights abuses in Nigeria have been wide spread since the military seized power. 
                                                 
10 Abacha held power until 1998. His successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, promoted the transition 
to a civil regime. The presidential election was implemented peacefully in February 1999. General 
Olusegun Obasanjo won the election and became the new president of Nigeria. 
 
 
14
The military junta dissolved the Nigerian parliament, banned political parties and 
political meetings. Tokyo considered these events a setback to the democratisation 
process and kept a close watch over the situation for signs of improvement. However, 
no tangible initiative designed to return the Nigerian government to civilian rule was 
offered. In March 1994, Tokyo suspended in principle aid to Nigeria, except aid on 
humanitarian grounds (MOFA, 1997: 70).  
  
Japan’s bilateral aid to Nigeria declined from US$50.4 million in 1992 to US$15.0 
million in 1993, and was halted completely in 1994. Technical co-operation increased 
slightly from US$7.0 million in 1992 to US$8.5 million in 1993, before decreasing to 
US$3.15 million in 1994 (MOFA, 1997: 70). 
  
i) The Gambia 
The Gambia is an exceptional African country where a multiparty system has been 
implemented since the country’s independence in 1965. The liberal-democratic political 
system of government was maintained with the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in 
power. However, in July 1994, a military coup d’etat led by Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh 
was carried out and the military seized power (MOFA, 1993c: 36-37).  
 
After the military coup d’etat, Japan in principle suspended foreign aid to the Gambia, 
except humanitarian and emergency assistance. Since then, as Japan’s ODA 1996 put it, 
“Japan is monitoring developments closely to determine whether specific moves are 
being made toward the restoration of democratic process” (MOFA, 1996: 103). 
 
Japan’s ODA to the Gambia decreased from US$11 million in 1994 to a marginal level 
of US$2 million in 1995. In 1995, Tokyo halted bilateral grants to the Gambia, but 
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continued providing grants for assistance for democratisation and grassroots projects, 
which amounted to ¥29 million (US$31 thousand) (MOFA, 1996: 337-338). 
 
It should be noted that Japan suspended or reduced her foreign aid to the repressive 
regimes in Africa without attempting to use foreign aid as a diplomatic tool to influence 
political situation in the region. The Japanese government responded to the deterioration 
of political situation in African countries by implementing negative reinforcement.  For 
example, Japan promptly suspended foreign aid when coup d’etats occurred in several 
African countries, i.e., in Sierra Leone (1992), Zambia (1993), Nigeria (1994) and The 
Gambia (1994). Also, Japan suspended foreign aid to Zaire (1991) and Sudan (1992) at 
the time when those countries were undergoing serious political and social turmoil. 
Despite military conflicts in Zaire and Sudan, Japan did not attempt to employ her 
foreign aid as a tool to resolve those conflicts (Furuoka, 2006).              
 
4. Evaluation of Japanese Aid Sanctions in Africa 
Japan applied positive reinforcement and provided additional foreign aid to assist the 
political and economic reforms in Madagascar, Zambia and Guinea. However, it would 
be an oversimplification to say that these positive reinforcement methods have 
effectively contributed to the improvement of the political situations in these countries. 
The political situation in Zambia deteriorated after the election in 1991. In Guinea, the 
military junta continued to control the country. Only in Madagascar, have there been 
some positive developments after the election in 1992 when the newly elected 
government discarded the socialist ideology and pledged to establish a system based on 
human rights and democracy (MOFA, 1993b, 151-152). However, the major factor 
behind Madagascar’s transformation to a more democratic system was the efforts of the 
French government that stressed the political conditions in the former French colonies 
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(Aoki, 1998: 6).  
 
Japan contributed to development in Africa not only by giving foreign aid. The Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development (TICAD) was an attempt by the 
Japanese government to show an alternative development model to African countries. 
Some Japanese policymakers are sceptical about Western attempts to induce 
development and democracy in Africa.  For example, a top Japanese diplomat, Director 
of the African Division (II) of the MOFA, Kiyokazu Ota, argues that Japan should 
recognise an “African way of democracy” and refrain from applying Western standards 
to African countries (Gaiko Foramu, August/September, 1998: 26). 
 
Some Japanese scholars share this point of view. A researcher from a government think-
tank maintains that African countries should embrace the “African way of democracy”. 
He argues that if, as in some Asian nations, African countries adopt authoritarian 
political systems to develop their economies and such systems contribute to the 
advancement of the nation’s welfare, the authoritarianism can be justified (Gaiko 
Foramu, August/September, 1998: 26). 
 
According to Stein (1998: 45), the Japanese government, especially the MOFA, is 
particularly critical about the feasibility of the “Structural Adjustment Policy” 
advocated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). He claims that 
after a high-ranking African official criticised the social dimension of the adjustment 
policy, the MOFA asked UNCTAD (United Nations Conference for Trade and 
Development) to reassess applying the lessons from Asian development to Africa. 
  
At least three questions arise concerning the relevance of the TICAD. First, Asian 
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countries had been developing in a specific international environment that T.J. Pempel 
called the “Developmental Regime”. Western countries supported East Asian countries 
by providing them with vast amounts of foreign aid and importing their production. 
However, a unique “Asian Development Model” cannot be easily transferred to other 
regions. As Pempel (2000: 82) put it, “It is highly unlikely that potential emulator will 
have anything like the favourable international conditions that were enjoyed by these 
countries (East Asian countries)”.   
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Figure 1   Negative Reinforcement in Africa 
 
 
Second, after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the region faced a serious economic 
setback. Despite the fact that during the Tokyo conference in 1993, delegates were 
sufficiently impressed by the successful economic performance of East Asian nations, 
African leaders might not any longer be interested in learning from Asia. The 
fundamental question remains: are the lessons from Asia really relevant for African 
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countries? 
 
Another point to consider is that Asian countries stressed economic development as the 
ultimate target for a nation. East Asian countries with strong propensities for promotion 
of economic development could be defined as “developmental states”. According to 
Peter Evans (1995), the developmental states tend to act as coherent entities to deliver 
the collective good. Such developmental states tend to be immersed in dense networks 
of groups and classes that can become allies in the pursuit of the societal goal, which is 
“economic development”.    
 
In “developmental states”, authoritarian regimes are justified for the sake of 
development. Chalmers Johnson (2000: 53) gave the following answer to the question 
as to whether the developmental state is democratic, “If one means by democracy some 
form of state accountability to the representatives of the majority of citizens combined 
with respect for the rights of minorities, the answer is probably no”. In other words, 
there is a danger that African countries might be tempted to justify authoritarian rule by 
adopting the “Developmental State Model” argument. 
 
Japan has weak economic and diplomatic ties with African countries. Because of that 
the Japanese government is not concerned about hurting Japan’s interests by employing 
negative reinforcement in Africa, and when aid sanctions are to be applied to improve 
the political situations in African countries, the Japanese government collaborates with 
other aid donors (see Figure 1). For example, Japan together with other donor countries 
cut foreign aid for the balance of payment deficits in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. The 
Japanese government further introduced negative reinforcement in Togo, Zaire, the 
Gambia and Nigeria following aid sanctions by the European Union against these 
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countries (Eyinla, 1999: 86). 
  
Kaoru Okuizumi draws attention to the fact that Tokyo promptly suspended aid to 
Kenya in 1991, when human rights abuses were at their worst. Even after Japan and 
other donors resumed aid in November 1993, Tokyo continued to stress that future 
assistance depended on Kenya’s efforts to improve its human rights record. As 
Okuizumi (1995: 395) put it, “Unlike China and Indonesia, Kenya is neither a major 
source of natural resources nor a significant trading partner and thus contributes little to 
either Japan’s natural resource or market security”.  
 
Soderberg points out that Tokyo acted in accordance with other donors when in 1992 it 
did not hesitate to take strict measures against Malawi and Sierra Leone. According to 
her, it was done because economic and diplomatic ties between Japan and the two 
countries were very weak. “With Sierra Leone, Malawi... there is more flexible (aid 
policy) as both the diplomatic and trade relations are of negligible importance” 
(Soderberg, 1996: 143).  
  
The Japanese government is very keen to preserve Japan’s status as a leading aid donor. 
Because of this, the government is often reluctant to cut foreign aid to Japan’s major aid 
recipients. Okuizumi maintains that Japan suspended aid to Zaire and Sudan without 
hesitation because this measure would not significantly lower Japan’s total aid flows 
and weaken her status of being a leading aid donor. According to him, when in 1991 
human rights violations occurred in Indonesia, Zaire and Sudan, 9.7 percent of Japan’s 
total ODA went to Indonesia, 4.7 percent was distributed in Sudan and only 0.2 percent 
of total foreign aid was given to Zaire. Okuizumi argues that withdrawing or decreasing 
aid to major recipient countries, such as Indonesia, runs contrary to Japan’s goal to 
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maintain top donorship. Therefore, “Aid programmes in Sudan and Zaire were 
suspended while those in Indonesia were not” (Okuizumi, 1995: 398).    
 
Whether Japan’s and other aid donors’ measures have contributed to the improvement 
of the political situation in African countries is a contentious issue. Thus, there has been 
no obvious improvement in the political conditions in Sierra Leone, Zaire (the 
Democratic Republics of Congo) and Sudan. In Sierra Leone, Lieutenant Colonel 
Johnny Paul Koromah established a military junta and anti-government forces have 
been active in the country. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, there has been a 
serious conflict that involved foreign military forces from Uganda and Rwanda. In 
Sudan, in 1999, after a serious power struggle Omar Hassan al-Bashir declared a state of 
emergency, dissolved the assembly and suspended parts of the constitution (Furuoka, 
2006). 
  
In Togo, an undemocratic leader, Gnassingbe Eyadema, stayed in power for thirty years. 
Despite Japanese and other donors’ sanctions there have been no signs of improvement 
in the country’s political situation. To some extent, sanctions did not work in Togo due 
to the French government’s support for Eyadema’s regime (The Economist, July 4, 
1998: 40). 
   
In Zambia, President Frederick Chiluba was expected to steer the country to the path of 
democracy. Aoki (1998: 18) points out that although the democratic situation has 
improved after the presidential election, under Chiluba, corruption was rampant and 
people started to show dissatisfaction with the regime. He warns that aid donors should 
not be too optimistic about the political situation in Zambia. In a similar vein, an 
international journal reported in 1999 that Chiluba’s zeal for privatisation programs was 
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soon dampened by corruption that was becoming a great break on progress (The 
Economist, June 26, 1999: 23-25).        
 
There have been no positive changes in the Gambia since Japan suspended foreign aid 
in 1994. A major African journal reported in 1998 that despite international 
condemnation, violations of human rights continued under the Jammeh regime. Besides, 
there had been growing frictions between the government and the Muslim community 
and political opponents of the government were harassed (The New African, December 
1998: 20). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 There were three cases of positive reinforcement in Africa, i.e. in Madagascar (1991), 
Zambia (1992) and Guinea (1992). Also, the Japanese government implemented nine 
negative reinforcements in the region, i.e. in Kenya (1991), Zaire (1991), Malawi 
(1992), Sudan (1992), Sierra Leone (1993), Zambia (1993), Togo (1993), Nigeria 
(1994) and The Gambia (1994).  
 
Although Japan applied positive reinforcement and provided additional foreign aid to 
assist the political and economic reforms in three African countries, it would be an 
oversimplification to say that these positive reinforcement methods have effectively 
contributed to the improvement of the political situations in these countries. 
 
On the other hand, Japan has weak economic and diplomatic ties with African countries. 
Because of that the Japanese government is not concerned about hurting Japan’s 
interests by employing negative reinforcement in Africa, and when aid sanctions are to 
be applied to improve the political situations in African countries, the Japanese 
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government collaborates with other aid donors. Furthermore, whether Japan’s and other 
aid donors’ measures have contributed to the improvement of the political situation in 
African countries is a contentious issue. For example, there has been no obvious 
improvement in the political conditions in Sierra Leone, Zaire and Sudan. 
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